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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER SUPPLY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
“Es La Pólitica, Pero No Es La Práctica:” 
Translating Reforms in the DR’s Rural Water Sector
Elizabeth Johnson, United States of America 
Introduction
The Dominican Republic’s Rural Aqueduct Decentralization 
Project [RADP] followed two parallel policy prescriptions 
informed by New Institutional Economics [NIE] 1) improved 
accountability mechanisms between clients and providers 
and 2) an efficient functional division of labor determined 
by complementarities of expertise. 
RADP policies: community participation and manage-
ment of water systems; co-production of public services; 
inter-organizational partnerships and the attempt to establish 
the state water agency as the regulator of a pluralistic water 
sector1, can be seen as attempts to strengthen accountability 
mechanisms between clients and service providers, as well 
as to efficiently divide tasks between community and or-
ganizational actors. Actual outcomes suggest the provision 
of water in rural areas of the Dominican Republic is still 
largely determined by patronage.
How the Dominican Republic’s national institute of potable 
and purified water and sewers [INAPA] maintained its posi-
tion within the patronage politics despite an ambitious reform 
program is best understood examining the transactional 
nature of the policy process. While the RADP introduced 
new methods to work with communities and NGO’s, it 
didn’t address the underlying patronage politics nor resource 
dependency incentive systems. Instead, reform processes 
and roles were negotiated to further the parallel interests of 
INAPA-UEAR, NGO’s, and community members. These 
negotiations were informed by a common context of resource 
dependency and patronage.
Accountability and the functional division of 
labor
As outlined in the 2004 World Development Report, NIE 
posits that services for poor people improve as account-
ability mechanisms between clients and service providers 
are strengthened and made more direct2. If clients, via exit 
and voice mechanisms, can directly affect the incentives a 
provider is faced with, then providers will be more respon-
sive to clients. The changes of roles and relationships dur-
ing the RADP can be understood as attempts to align state, 
non-profit and community actors’ incentives more closely 
with RADP goals: increased coverage and sustainability of 
water systems.
The functional division of labor between NGO’s, INAPA 
and community groups could not only facilitate the exit 
option for clients, but also exploit complementarities of 
capacity, expertise and local knowledge. Under this policy 
model, NGO’s and communities could benefit from INAPA’s 
technical expertise, while INAPA could benefit from their 
superior local knowledge. 
Background
Since 1996, INAPA has been reforming and reorganizing its 
rural water program. In 1996, then-President Fernandez inau-
gurated the rural aqueduct decentralization project [RADP] 
and created the rural aqueducts executive unit [UEAR], to 
provide an organizational base to achieve greater coverage 
and sustainability. Sustainability would be achieved through 
community management of water systems and oversight of 
the quality of NGO installed systems. Increasing national 
water service coverage was intended to occur via INAPA-
UEAR’s new role as coordinator / regulator of the water 
sector and partnerships with NGO’s3. With funding from 
USAID, INAPA has been working with the Environmental 
Health Project [EHP], a private consultancy group, to tran-
sition from an ineffectual service provider to a regulatory 
body that effectively coordinates the work of NGO’s in rural 
areas4. This new role is in line with the current international 
consensus that the role of the state should be the coordinator 
of a competitive and efficient water sector5. The community 
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participation component is modeled off of USAID’s “total 
community participation” [TCP] methodology, designed to 
increase the exercise of the voice accountability mechanisms 
available to community members. Legally incorporated 
community water associations [ASOCAR’s] would assume 
responsibility for the operation and maintenance of water 
systems, allowing those with the most information about 
local conditions, as well as the greatest incentive to maintain 
local water systems. 
“Es la politica, pero no es la práctica”
The RADP essentially created a new department, the UEAR, 
which attracts outside funding for INAPA’s rural water 
programs. These new relationships put new pressures on 
INAPA-UEAR to structure its service delivery activities in 
manner more in line with the methods condoned by the in-
ternational development community. These methods include 
community participation, inter-organizational partnerships 
based on organizational complementarities, government 
coordination of NGO activities, needs-based targeting, and 
integrated water and sanitation public health programs. 
However, these are methods, not outcomes. The imple-
mentation of these various methods has been significantly 
affected by patronage incentive systems operating within 
INAPA. INAPA’s role within the context of patronage 
politics nationally and locally is to provide visible public 
investments, reinforcing the patron-client linkages that tie 
INAPA’s leadership and employees to patrons and clients 
in remote rural communities. The RADP did little to affect 
internal incentive systems permutated by patronage and 
clientalism. 
The result is that complementarities of information and 
capacity have not been capitalized upon. Program managers 
at INAPA have little incentive to coordinate NGO activities 
or collaborate with organizations that don’t offer financial 
resources. Instead of serving as a mechanism to gain local 
time-place information, community management has be-
come a mechanism to legitimately disinvest from completed 
projects. This disinvestment allows patronage networks to 
be expanded or strengthened by inaugurating more projects. 
While this delegation of responsibility is justified in terms of 
increasing system sustainability, INAPA doesn’t monitor for 
sustainability. This means that system sustainability has no 
bearing on the incentives faced by INAPA employees. Project 
inaugurations, however, are closely monitored political events 
that reinforce and expand patronage networks, and serve as 
measures of program success. This double-layered incen-
tive system ensures that individual performance is judged in 
terms of completed projects, not in terms of sustainability. 
It is no surprise that the vast majority of INAPA-UEAR’s 
budget is spent on constructing new systems rather than on 
ensuring their sustainability. 
Methods
I gathered this report’s primary data in the Dominican Re-
public in July, 2005. After a series of community visits with 
INAPA and NGO staff, I conducted semi-structured inter-
views with current and former INAPA staff and staff from 
NGO’s and USAID; as well as community water association 
leaders. Additionally, I attended a conference of community 
water association leaders. I collected survey results from this 
conference, grey literature from INAPA’s library and files, 
literature from collaborating NGO’s, and policy papers by 
relevant intergovernmental organizations.
Reform history and rationale 
Pre-Reform Organizational Form
Water services in the Dominican Republic have historically 
been provided by the central government. After a short 
period of municipal provision of water services, in 1962 
INAPA was chartered. Before 1996, the commercial office 
of promotion had responsibility for rural aqueducts6. When 
international aid organizations worked with INAPA, their 
offices were semi-autonomous within the INAPA structure. 
The majority of rural water projects occurred under their 
auspices, staffed, in part, by INAPA employees.
At INAPA, as in the rest of the Dominican Republic, 
public goods were a form of political currency. Patronage 
substituted for local knowledge and/or coherent policy in 
the selection of communities, outside of externally funded 
programs. Despite formal criteria for community selection, 
the final decision to work in a particular community was 
centralized and often came from the office of the president. 
This particularization of policy and lack of bureaucratic 
autonomy was particularly evident in the channels through 
which community members sought to access services. As 
INAPA lacked substantial presence in rural areas, and had 
little direct contact with confrontational grassroots organiza-
tions or local NGO’s, it received information on community 
needs from two nation-wide networks. First, the general 
directorate of community development acted as a door to the 
state in communities. Second, community members directly 
solicited local political bosses, who sent requests directly to 
the president, who would pass the list to INAPA7. 
The effects of the recently strengthened civil service law 
have yet to be felt in INAPA. The majority of civil servants 
are replaced with the change of government., While there 
were reports of greater job security under Balaguer, after 
his succession, appointment and advancement became in-
creasingly political8. Only the very best of the street-level 
functionaries are re-hired after regime changes (three out of 
the social promotion staff of 17, most recently). The depart-
ment heads are nearly always replaced, regardless of skill; 
this leaves very little incentive to improve job performance, 
as performance promises only tenuous job security.
INAPA is mandated responsibility for all water for hu-
man use in the Dominican Republic; however, this doesn’t 
describe the institutional reality.. Limited resources and 
capacity constrained INAPA’s ability to provide water to the 
majority of rural communities or to maintain those already 
provided. NGO’s and other state agencies filled this void. Of 
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the 2,500 rural water systems estimated to be in the country, 
1,500 were built by NGO’s and other agencies9. Mistrust, 
lack of information sharing, and indifference characterized 
NGO-INAPA relations10. 
Water system sustainability was hindered by INAPA’s 
limited resources and incentive. Systems installed under the 
national rural aqueduct plan of the 1970’s fell into disrepair 
as local participation dwindled to collecting user fees to pay 
INAPA11. As Esman cautions, installing infrastructure is 
more politically attractive than maintenance12. When heading 
a government bureaucracy can lead to political office, the 
attraction can be even stronger. The former head of INAPA, 
Roberto Rodriguez, was elected senator of his province, the 
Seibo, after installing many aqueducts in the region13. The 
current head of INAPA publicly charges that many of these 
systems were installed with insufficient planning and water 
sources14. Obviously, the pressing concern was the construc-
tion of new systems, not their durability.
Purposes for reform
The UEAR and the RADP were initiated by executive de-
cree during the first term of President Leonel Fernandez15. 
The goals of the RADP were to: create an organizational 
base with specialized staff for small rural water projects; 
and to promote greater sustainability and coverage through 
community management of water systems and re-defining 
INAPA’s role as the sector coordinator16. 
INAPA-UEAR’s new organizational role was tailored 
to existing sector and organizational conditions: limited 
resources and participation in the sector by “a multitude of 
other agencies and organizations”17. By establishing inter-
organizational relationships, INAPA-UEAR would facilitate, 
coordinate and regulate the quality of investment in rural 
areas by NGO’s while coordinating complementarities of 
organizational strengths18; in which NGO’s were cast as 
especially capable interfacing with rural communities19. 
However, given the de-facto plurality of the sector before the 
RADP, it can also be seen as an ex-post attempt to officiate 
an already pluralistic sector. 
Similarly, community management of water systems via 
a legally incorporated water association (an ASOCAR) 
represents a delegation of responsibility for the operation 
and maintenance of water systems, due to INAPA-UEAR’s 
lack of capacity to fulfill its legal responsibility to maintain 
and operate all of the rural water systems constructed in 
the country, rather than representing an attempt to increase 
community influence over local water systems, or over 
INAPA-UEAR20. The RADP came not so much from desire 
to integrate more effective forms of community and NGO 
voice and exit, as it was an attempt to fulfill INAPA-UEAR’s 
legal responsibility and mandate through the delegation and 
regulation of activities outside of its capacity, but within 
its remit.
International consensus, resource dependency 
and role definition
By assuming the role of sector coordinator, INAPA-UEAR 
cast itself as a legitimate state actor in the discourse of the 
major donor agencies. The dominant development discourse 
shared by the major donors to the Dominican Republic: US-
AID, Co-operación Española, IADB, and GTZ, echoes the 
transition from rolling back an incapable state to strengthening 
that same incapable state to better coordinate development 
activities of the now pluralistic sector. The IADB has of-
fered US$ 70.4 million for the reform of the water sector in 
the Dominican Republic contingent upon the passage of an 
accompanying legislation, aimed at increasing the efficiency 
of water providers through competition. Rural parts of the 
sector are slated to receive less than 10 percent of this aid 
package. INAPA-UEAR would no longer be the owner / 
agent of rural water systems but rather “RWSS sector plan-
ner, regulator, monitor and possible funder”21. 
In order to secure funding in the current context, where 
state and aid funding are decreasing to state agencies that 
provide services directly, INAPA has recast itself as a 
regulator and facilitator of the water sector. INAPA-UEAR 
has successfully been able to maintain, if not increase, its 
legitimacy within the donor community by delegating its 
previous activities and responsibilities to NGO’s and com-
munity members.
Implementation and negotiation
The delegation and regulation of water sector activities 
hasn’t lead to significant changes in the influence that 
INAPA-UEAR, community groups, and NGO’s have over 
each other. Therefore, NIE analysis would not predict any 
significant change in service provision, as INAPA-UEAR 
faces no new pressure from communities or competing 
organizations to perform better. Nor has INAPA-UEAR 
been able to establish itself as a sector regulator because 
the RADP has not significantly changed the incentive and 
accountability systems that govern the interfaces between 
INAPA-UEAR and communities or between INAPA-UEAR 
and NGO’s.
Negotiations at the interface
The definition of the functional divisions of labor between 
INAPA, NGO’s and ASOCAR’s is largely determined by 
the negotiations of the meaning and legitimacy of the roles 
of the various development actors. Changes achieved by 
the reform, thus depend upon how the reform is translated 
and negotiated at the various development interfaces. The 
translation and negotiation of reform processes at the interface 
between INAPA and its donor agencies, national NGO’s and 
communities are evaluated in the following section.
Coordinating and collaborating with NGOs
Lack of organizational capacity constrains INAPA- UEAR’s 
ability to coordinate NGO activities, out-compete NGO’s 
for state or aid funds, or to establish and maintain long-term 
organizational co-operation despite apparent complementari-
ties of organizational strengths. INAPA-UEAR has a limited 
presence in rural areas; many local, national, and international 
NGO’s remain unaware that INAPA even builds small rural 
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water systems22. INAPA-UEAR lacks both the presence and 
legitimacy necessary to effectively act as a regulator. It also 
lacks the political influence to enforce regulation, as political 
officials run many NGO’s23, and proposed sanctions need 
congressional approval24. 
INAPA-UEAR is only beginning to actively inform itself 
of NGO’s involved in rural water provision. INAPA-UEAR 
has thus far established relationships with a handful of 
NGO’s, but these relationships tend to change with politi-
cal regimes25.  
Relationships between INAPA-UEAR and NGO’s are 
a matter of will on the part of both organizations26. Those 
NGO’s and inter-governmental organizations seeking to 
strengthen state capacity are beginning to actively seek 
out relationships with INAPA-UEAR27. The Spanish Aid 
agency requires Spanish NGO’s to alert INAPA-UEAR of 
their activities and to submit their designs to INAPA for ap-
proval28. Only one national NGO, MUDE, regularly checks 
its water system plans with INAPA. 
Despite INAPA’s technical resources available to collabo-
rating NGO’s29, there are few incentives to accept INAPA as 
a coordinator. For NGO’s, to collaborate with INAPA is to 
voluntarily submit to regulation. Few NGO’s see the neces-
sity of, or have the resources to, comply with the INAPA’s 
strict design standards30. At a recent conference with NGO’s 
working in the water sector, these standards were lowered, 
but not to a level that most NGO’s consider appropriate 
or affordable in remote areas31. Additionally many NGO’s 
feel uncomfortable with what they see as the politics and/or 
patronage-related aspects of INAPA-UEAR’s work . 
Indeed, the political nature of INAPA-UEAR’s work can be 
seen as a disincentive for the agency to regulate the activities 
of NGO’s. In addition to the obvious political risks of con-
fronting the “pet” NGOs of legislators, regulation activities 
occupy skilled INAPA-UEAR staff33, while INAPA-UEAR 
gets little recognition for this work locally -- compared to 
INAPA’s aqueducts which are publicly inaugurated, painted 
blue and bear INAPA’s seal. Nor can INAPA choose the 
communities to benefit from this regulatory investment as 
easily. Even when working with NGO’s that match funds, 
or completely fund collaborative projects, INAPA-UEAR 
negotiates to implement projects in politically strategic 
communities or provinces34. Relationships with external 
aid agencies, a resource acquisition strategy of INAPA, 
have the most influence over the ways that INAPA-UEAR 
works with communities, from introducing the TCP model 
on the part of USAID to imposing a policy of needs-based 
standards for community selection on the part of Cooper-
ación Española. However, INAPA-UEAR could hardly be 
seen as the coordinator of these relationships, as the power 
sits with the donor organization – “He who pays the piper 
calls the tune”35. 
The durability and nature of INAPA-UEAR’s inter-organi-
zational relationships depend upon the financial resources that 
the organizational partner brings to the relationship. INAPA 
has little incentive to coordinate or regulate the activities of 
non-funding organizations while it lacks the necessary lever-
age to coordinate the activities of donor organizations.
Coordination of autonomous and oppositional 
NGOs
The historical and cultural context of NGO activity in the Do-
minican Republic has shaped current collaboration between 
NGO’s and INAPA-UEAR, not organizational complementa-
rities, belying the non-efficiency considerations in the func-
tional division of labor between NGO’s and INAPA-UEAR. 
Rather, these collaborations are most affected by issues of 
legitimacy, autonomy and resource dependency. 
As NGO’s absorb increasing amounts of aid and govern-
ment funds36, government agencies have come to regard 
NGO’s as sources of income37. Currently, national NGO’s 
registered with the government are viewed largely as income 
earning mechanisms for politically connected individu-
als38. Although in recent years, international donors, such 
as USAID, have begun to funnel more aid to government 
agencies39, relationships between INAPA-UEAR and NGO’s 
remain largely dependent upon the resources the NGO’s are 
able to bring to the partnership.
Although this is reflected in the increasing amount of 
money in INAPA-UEAR’s budget that comes from NGO 
partnerships, the political and cultural histories of both 
service provision and Dominican NGO’s have complicated 
NGO – INAPA-UEAR relationships, as historical roles are 
re-negotiated under a new political economic context. 
Under Balaguer, civil society organizations were op-
positional and sometimes necessarily clandestine groups. 
National civil society groups and NGO’s find their cur-
rent interface with government agencies colored by past 
experience, where40 working independently of government 
influence has a long precedence, and may inform decisions 
to not collaborate with government actors. Additionally, 
working with what is regarded as an ineffectual and corrupt 
state may threaten the legitimacy of NGO’s, long defined 
as local allies against the state. NGO’s ability to reject state 
coordination illustrates state weakness.
Community management
INAPA did not intend community management of water sys-
tems to entail any change in the influence community groups 
had over INAPA, the goals of community management were: 
increased sustainability and establishing a financially viable 
system for system maintenance. In fact, the creation of the 
UEAR may have actually limited an important channel for 
voice. Before the RADP, community members would go to 
the municipal government offices to petition for water serv-
ices, and they could threaten to vote against the incumbent 
municipal government; now they direct their petitions to 
INAPA-UEAR’s office in the capital, where their threatened 
political exit option has less political force. 
TCP, as implemented by INAPA, affords community 
members minimal leverage to influence INAPA-UEAR’s 
behavior. INAPA-UEAR has several non-negotiable terms 
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under which it will provide a water system41. INAPA-UEAR 
is able to present its terms as non-negotiable because its 
threatened exit has worse consequences for community 
members than for itself. Community input, beyond the 
location and condition of community water sources is not 
solicited nor respected by INAPA-UEAR’S engineers42. If 
the engineers determine that several delivery options are 
viable, INAPA-UEAR social promoters convene a com-
munity assembly to discuss the different options in light of 
maintenance costs43. Once the system has been installed, it is 
handed over to the community water association for operation 
and maintenance44. However, the presidents and officers of 
these associations feel responsible to INAPA45,and associa-
tions are re-organized at INAPA’s bidding46. Community 
management of water systems represents a delegation of 
responsibility, not an increase in the influence local people 
have over INAPA-UEAR’s projects.
Negotiated meanings and roles involved in 
community participation
Roles in the division of labor between community members 
and INAPA-UEAR are negotiated between community 
members, NGO’s and INAPA-UEAR. 
While community members are willing to contribute their 
time, labor and resources to NGO programs, many feel 
entitled to the services they see as the responsibility of the 
state47, or less commonly, see their vote as payment for a 
project48. What community members are willing to contribute 
as “community participation” changes with the nature of the 
service provider. When working with INAPA, community 
organizations are set up to receive INAPA’s systems.
Power relationships between communities and INAPA-
UEAR play a significant part determining the roles of 
community water associations. INAPA-UEAR dictates 
community contributions as conditions to collaborations 
between INAPA-UEAR and communities. Community as-
sociation responsibilities have little to do with the type of 
involvement community members prefer. They generally 
prefer to participate in meetings and educational activities49, 
instead community associations take responsibility for system 
operation and maintenance. Delegating these responsibilities 
to community members allows INAPA-UEAR to engage 
its resources constructing more water systems, without be-
ing charged with neglecting the maintenance of completed 
systems. 
Involvement in community water associations is mediated 
by community roles and links to patronage networks beyond 
the community. Pre-existing community roles play a large 
part in the process of picking community leaders to head 
community water associations, as the leaders are commonly 
members and leaders of other community associations50. It is 
also common for the association president to donate land for 
the pump and cistern, and to operate the system51. While this 
arrangement gives the president a huge amount of influence 
over the system operation and finances, the arrangement is 
commonly described in terms of personal role and respon-
sibility in the community52. In both views, the individual 
is reinforcing his/her role as a local patron, by establishing 
political and de-facto control over a local resource. 
Linkages with the local and national political machinery 
also inform the make-up of community water associations. 
Association leaders often count as part of their power-base 
their links to local political bosses53. This can lead to dif-
ficulties when local political bosses, who provided the 
initial contact with INAPA-UEAR, use the water outside 
of INAPA-UEAR’s regulations, often to water cattle or ir-
rigate54. However, political linkages are considered important 
enough that it is common practice for water associations to 
hold elections after a change of party nationally so that new 
members are in the same party as the new INAPA-UEAR 
staff, in order to ensure that relations between the commu-
nity and INAPA-UEAR run smoothly55. When community 
management processes are translated into the institutional 
context of community members, they often reinforce exist-
ing power relationships. The negotiation of the community 
management roles is informed by the same institutional 
context that informs existing power relationships within 
communities.
The ASOCAR: an institutional mechanism for 
sustainability?
In order to increase the sustainability of installed systems 
without further over-taxing its organizational capacity, 
INAPA-UEAR aimed to create legally incorporated entities, 
the ASOCARs, to assume responsibility for the operation 
and maintenance of water systems. The ASOCAR’s legal 
status allows elected members to apply for loans and estab-
lish bank accounts for the water system. Additionally, the 
ASOCAR is a formal vehicle to access INAPA’s technical 
resources, independent of particularistic political patronage 
links. NGO’s aware of the legal status of ASOCARs see this 
as a guarantee of the sustainability of their investments56. 
While INAPA-UEAR maintains legal ownership of the 
equipment, and assumes responsibility for repairs outside 
of the expertise of local plumbers, the ASOCAR is expected 
to fund nearly all repairs and maintenance as well as to hire 
operators and plumbers. 
ASOCARs have been able to respond to even severe 
disasters more quickly than INAPA-UEAR57. However, 
this capacity is entirely dependent upon the ability to col-
lect sufficient user fees, the skill with which ASOCARs 
struggle most58. 
The transaction costs involved in incorporation have 
significantly limited the number of ASOCARs59. To date, 
five ASOCARs have been incorporated. Nearly all planned 
incorporations depend on funding from Co-operacion Es-
pañola60. INAPA-UEAR has yet to begin to “decentralize” 
water systems built before the RADP, and considers the 
current batch of 23 ASOCARs a backlog from the previous 
regime61. In 2005, INAPA-UEAR hoped to incorporate 60 
ASOCARs and to double the number for 200662. While 
ASOCARs can facilitate community management and out-
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side agency investment in the water sector, the transaction 
costs of incorporation have thus far limited their number 
to an insignificant percentage of community water system 
management options.
Reform outcomes
The goals of RADP were to expand coverage and sustain-
ability of water systems in rural areas while keeping within 
INAPA’s limited resources. In the eight years following the 
RADP, more rural people annually receive new water sys-
tems from INAPA than in the four years before the reform. 
Through increasing the number of collaborative projects, 
INAPA-UEAR has been able to augment its budget signifi-
cantly and is increasingly involved in providing integrated 
water and sanitation programs. However, the water quality 
of rural water systems is unmonitored. The sustainability of 
community-managed systems is unknown. The pressures of 
patronage and the accompanying focus on initial delivery 
have significantly undercut improved targeting and sustain-
ability of water projects. 
Efficacy
Despite its status as a dependent of the secretary of health, 
INAPA doesn’t provide integrated water and sanitation 
services. INAPA builds potable water delivery systems and 
the occasional sewage treatment plant. Accordingly, water 
projects have lead to limited results in terms of health and 
human development63. Water systems installed collabora-
tively with other organizations may be integrated into larger 
public health packages at the insistence of collaborating 
agencies64. However, this work is seen as tangential to the 
specific role of INAPA-UEAR, and largely goes unrecorded 
in institutional memory. 
Monitoring, incentives and sustainability
Patronage politics deeply affect the institutional memory 
at INAPA. First, documentation from previous regimes is 
rarely referred to by current INAPA-UEAR staff. Second, 
because the onus is on system inauguration, rather than 
durability or public health outcomes, INAPA-UEAR does 
not monitor for the sustainability or performance of its 
systems directly or indirectly. INAPA’s laboratory is open 
to ASOCAR members who wish to check the quality of 
water in their system, however this is dependent upon their 
initiative and they are expected to bear all of the costs of 
transporting test specimens65. 
INAPA-UEAR has no way of knowing if it is achieving its 
goal of sustainability. ASOCAR members alert supervisors 
of problems when there is a problem they don’t have the 
technical expertise or funds to repair66. Of limited surveys 
taken of completed systems, about sixty percent of the systems 
were still functioning. Of the nine water systems installed in 
Hato Mayor during the pilot project, only four were working 
four years later67. Out of twenty-eight systems of various 
ages surveyed in mid July of 2005, nineteen water systems 
were functioning68. There is no data from before the RADP 
regarding system durability. The most common response 
by INAPA employees regarding system sustainability is: 
“These systems are designed to last twenty years”69. This 
is reflected in monitoring systems and records concerned 
mainly with the inauguration of new systems.
Increases in coverage
According to the annual inauguration records, there has been 
a trend over the past eight years of increasing numbers of 
beneficiaries served by INAPA. However, it is far from clear 
if this increase is due to, or greatly affected by the RADP. 
In the four years directly before the RADP an average of 
28,751 people per year received a new rural water system, 
compared with 29,794 per year directly following the RADP 
and then 108,100 per year in the last four years70. However, 
annual numbers vary by as much as tenfold from year to year. 
Also, this is an aggregate number, there is no record that 
disaggregates systems installed by INAPA-UEAR via TCP 
/ collaborative methodologies. Other factors that may have 
affected this trend include, but are not limited to: changes 
in government, hurricane restoration in 1998 and 1999, and 
completing a four-year project with JICA in 1997. 
Targeting of services
A rough analysis of the degree to which targeting was based 
on need can be developed by comparing census figures for 
water services in households with the provinces most often 
served by INAPA-UEAR. With no evidence of needs-based 
targeting at the provincial level in the four years before the 
RADP, there hasn’t been an appreciable difference over the 
eight years of RADP71. The total number of water projects 
in the five provinces where the most people are in need of 
water went from 18 in the four years before the RADP to 
26 in the past four years72. However, this is compared to 11 
projects in the last four years the province of El Seibo. El 
Seibo has under two percent of those without water services 
within INAPA’s remit73. El Seibo, was however, the home 
province of the former director of INAPA, who is currently 
senator for El Seibo. 
Budgeting changes
INAPA has achieved an astounding increase in the number 
of people served per year considering its shrinking budget74. 
This increase in cost effectiveness can be partly attributed 
to the increase in collaborative projects between INAPA-
UEAR and other organizations. In the last four years, 
INAPA-UEAR has consistently installed around half of all 
of the rural water systems installed by INAPA75. In 2002, 
INAPA-UEAR covered just under 40 percent of its program 
costs with outside funding76. This percentage has consistently 
grown throughout the reform process77. As for other measures 
of cost effectiveness, the salaries of the entire social labor 
department, the department charged with ensuring system 
sustainability through community managed systems, totals 
RD$219,256.48 monthly78, representing less than five percent 
of INAPA-UEAR’s monthly budget of five million pesos79. 
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However, supervisors working in the social labor department 
are limited from visiting the communities they are responsible 
for by high cost of fuel and the scarcity of vehicles. 
The RADP has proven most successful at attracting outside 
funding to INAPA, allowing INAPA to inaugurate more 
systems and to provide more people annually with potable 
water. Changes in targeting practices or towards integrated 
public health goals have been byproducts of collaborative 
projects with funding agencies. These outcomes are in line 
with both organizational and individual interests as they 
interact with incentive systems permutated by patronage 
and clientalism. 
Looking forward
While INAPA-UEAR may have little interest in invest-
ing money, or more importantly, human resources in the 
sustainability of the rural water systems it installs through 
systematic follow-up activities with water associations, there 
are reasons to hope that community water systems in the 
Dominican Republic may begin to last longer than before. 
The Dominican Network of Rural Aqueducts [REDAR], 
made up of several community water associations was of-
ficially incorporated this past summer. Their goals are to 
provide education, technical assistance, and some sort of 
insurance fund to member communities. There are hopes 
that, with their incorporated status, REDAR may be able to 
access aid and government funding.
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